Iranian politics for the last year has been largely shaped by street protests. Far from a return to regular political processes, next year’s election can serve as a cautious sign where things are headed in the future. After all, it seems like anti-regime protests in Iran have become exhausted, greatly reducing compared to their peak last year. And whether they return, and how opposition in Iran continues, depends to a great deal on how the regime intends to govern in the coming years. Registration for the next legislative elections began in August, with results likely being announced next month. It is worthwhile watching who successfully emerges as candidates, as it shows how elites intend to govern in the face of widespread dissent.
Iranian elections serve mostly as competition within elites. This is due to the extremely restrictive vetting process, excluding most of the openly critical opposition and oftentimes even banning previous members or parliament or politicians fallen out of grace from running for office.
Elections then do not freely reflect public opinion, but only offer a very limited choice from within the elite. They can however reward those capable of galvanizing a degree of public support, resulting in some elements of meritocracy. Elections allow the regime to identify potential political talent, as well as pressing political issues among the populace.
Iranian elections have always been shaped by two competing goals. If the country’s ruler, Khamenei, seeks to maximize public support and legitimacy for the Iranian political system, he can authorise a more lenient vetting process, thus allowing for a more inclusive and competitive election. This was the case from 1997 to 2017, where Reformists and Conservatives were allowed to present competing electoral platforms and competition was encouraged, with turnout increasing from roughly 50 per cent in 1993 to almost 80 per cent in 1997 according to official data.
This, however, also empowers successful candidates, who might carve out agency for themselves. If the leadership wants to instead ensure control over politicians, it will seek to reduce potential dissenting voices and tightly control who rises to political positions. 2009, when the Green Movement claimed voter fraud, its leadership was able to mobilise masses partially due to its position within the system. As a result, these opposition actors were marginalised, strengthening elite cohesion while weakening the legitimacy of its electoral mechanisms.
Ever since 2009, the regime has prioritised political control over legitimacy, greatly reducing competitiveness. As a result, widespread dissatisfaction could not be translated into electoral campaigns and instead resulted increasingly in anti-regime protests. These prominently began in December 2017, with other peaks including the 2019 and 2022 protests.
Faced with widespread dissent, the regime decided against returning to the legitimizing function of elections, instead doubling down on its strategy of ensuring elite cohesion. In 2020 and 2021, almost no critical candidates were allowed to run, with successful ones handpicked to ensure their loyalty to Khamenei personally.
It came as no surprise then that last year’s protests largely rejected not only the Conservatives in power, but the political system altogether. What is more: Even many Reformist voices, who for two decades had supported the limited electoral system present in Iran, joined calls for a new constitution and different political course. Yet the protests also showed the limitations of opposition in a closed autocracy, which Iran has increasingly become: Not capable of organizing legally, its leadership largely imprisoned, killed or in exile, they had a hard time pressuring Iran’s current elites. And with the latter handpicked for loyalty rather than competence or political credentials, there were few fissures they could exploit to find allies from within the system.
One of the big questions for Iran’s future is how willing its leadership is to endure frequently returning mass protests, which since 2017 have become ever bigger and more desperate. Its gamble to prevent internal splits has so far paid off, but at the cost of greatly reduced political legitimacy and public support.
Next year’s elections are yet another test on how Khamenei evaluates this trade-off: Should he again limit competitiveness, this would show that he is willing to stay the course at least until the next presidential elections in 2028, responding to grievances voiced in street protests with repression rather than with compromise.
Should he allow for a bigger presence of moderate candidates, this would be a signal that he believes their claims of being able to pacify some dissatisfaction by providing an officially sanctioned outlet. This is further complicated by the ever-present rumors of Khamenei’s succession, which the 84-year-old ruler would want to be handled by trusted allies he needs to empower during his lifetime.
Either way, it seems unlikely that anyone who openly voiced dissent would be allowed to run. This all but ensures that the next election will resonate little with protesters. Even if Moderates are allowed to run, they will likely appeal to those who have neither joined the protests nor fully embraced the Conservatives.
Opponents of the regime will in turn try to highlight lack of competition in order to convince these bystanders that the system as it exists is unsustainable, in order to increase support for future protest movements. The candidate list for next year’s elections will give insights into how difficult of a task this is going to be
The writer is currently based at the Center for Conflict Studies in Marburg and his research interests include authoritarianism, social movements, and Iran.
Legitimacy or Control?
Iranian politics for the last year has been largely shaped by street protests. Far from a return to regular political processes, next year’s election can serve as a cautious sign where things are headed in the future. After all, it seems like anti-regime protests in Iran have become exhausted, greatly reducing compared to their peak last year. And whether they return, and how opposition in Iran continues, depends to a great deal on how the regime intends to govern in the coming years. Registration for the next legislative elections began in August, with results likely being announced next month. It is worthwhile watching who successfully emerges as candidates, as it shows how elites intend to govern in the face of widespread dissent.
Iranian elections serve mostly as competition within elites. This is due to the extremely restrictive vetting process, excluding most of the openly critical opposition and oftentimes even banning previous members or parliament or politicians fallen out of grace from running for office.
Elections then do not freely reflect public opinion, but only offer a very limited choice from within the elite. They can however reward those capable of galvanizing a degree of public support, resulting in some elements of meritocracy. Elections allow the regime to identify potential political talent, as well as pressing political issues among the populace.
Iranian elections have always been shaped by two competing goals. If the country’s ruler, Khamenei, seeks to maximize public support and legitimacy for the Iranian political system, he can authorise a more lenient vetting process, thus allowing for a more inclusive and competitive election. This was the case from 1997 to 2017, where Reformists and Conservatives were allowed to present competing electoral platforms and competition was encouraged, with turnout increasing from roughly 50 per cent in 1993 to almost 80 per cent in 1997 according to official data.
This, however, also empowers successful candidates, who might carve out agency for themselves. If the leadership wants to instead ensure control over politicians, it will seek to reduce potential dissenting voices and tightly control who rises to political positions. 2009, when the Green Movement claimed voter fraud, its leadership was able to mobilise masses partially due to its position within the system. As a result, these opposition actors were marginalised, strengthening elite cohesion while weakening the legitimacy of its electoral mechanisms.
Ever since 2009, the regime has prioritised political control over legitimacy, greatly reducing competitiveness. As a result, widespread dissatisfaction could not be translated into electoral campaigns and instead resulted increasingly in anti-regime protests. These prominently began in December 2017, with other peaks including the 2019 and 2022 protests.
Faced with widespread dissent, the regime decided against returning to the legitimizing function of elections, instead doubling down on its strategy of ensuring elite cohesion. In 2020 and 2021, almost no critical candidates were allowed to run, with successful ones handpicked to ensure their loyalty to Khamenei personally.
It came as no surprise then that last year’s protests largely rejected not only the Conservatives in power, but the political system altogether. What is more: Even many Reformist voices, who for two decades had supported the limited electoral system present in Iran, joined calls for a new constitution and different political course. Yet the protests also showed the limitations of opposition in a closed autocracy, which Iran has increasingly become: Not capable of organizing legally, its leadership largely imprisoned, killed or in exile, they had a hard time pressuring Iran’s current elites. And with the latter handpicked for loyalty rather than competence or political credentials, there were few fissures they could exploit to find allies from within the system.
One of the big questions for Iran’s future is how willing its leadership is to endure frequently returning mass protests, which since 2017 have become ever bigger and more desperate. Its gamble to prevent internal splits has so far paid off, but at the cost of greatly reduced political legitimacy and public support.
Next year’s elections are yet another test on how Khamenei evaluates this trade-off: Should he again limit competitiveness, this would show that he is willing to stay the course at least until the next presidential elections in 2028, responding to grievances voiced in street protests with repression rather than with compromise.
Should he allow for a bigger presence of moderate candidates, this would be a signal that he believes their claims of being able to pacify some dissatisfaction by providing an officially sanctioned outlet. This is further complicated by the ever-present rumors of Khamenei’s succession, which the 84-year-old ruler would want to be handled by trusted allies he needs to empower during his lifetime.
Either way, it seems unlikely that anyone who openly voiced dissent would be allowed to run. This all but ensures that the next election will resonate little with protesters. Even if Moderates are allowed to run, they will likely appeal to those who have neither joined the protests nor fully embraced the Conservatives.
Opponents of the regime will in turn try to highlight lack of competition in order to convince these bystanders that the system as it exists is unsustainable, in order to increase support for future protest movements. The candidate list for next year’s elections will give insights into how difficult of a task this is going to be
The writer is currently based at the Center for Conflict Studies in Marburg and his research interests include authoritarianism, social movements, and Iran.
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