UAE-Saudi Rivalry: Yemen as the Proxy Battlefield

Tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia have emerged as the new global hot spot, as Yemen’s civil war has now become the breeding ground for proxy conflict. What initially began as a joint UAE-Saudi effort to eliminate the Iran-backed Houthis in the region has now become a battleground for diverging Gulf ambitions, which has caused a split between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Ironically, Yemen no longer acts as a proxy against Iran for Gulf interests but has now become a ‘proxy war within a proxy war itself’ as Saudi-UAE ties take a hit. Understanding the reasons and background behind the Yemen civil war is crucial for us to dissect and reflect upon the deep strategic disconnect between the two allies.

Yemen’s civil war dates back to 2014 when Sana’a, the nation’s capital, was seized by the Iranian-backed Houthis, who managed to overthrow the internationally recognised legitimate regime at the time. Alarmed by the Houthis’ unchecked growing influence, the UAE and Saudi Arabia initially formed a military coalition in 2015 in the hopes of restoring the Yemeni government and aiming to curb Iran’s influence within the Arabian Peninsula. However, they ultimately failed despite decades of blockades and intensive airstrikes, which instead paved the way for the Houthis to entrench their control over Northern Yemen by launching attacks on Saudi and UAE territory, which won them a truce in 2022. However, while the truce was in order, the UAE-Saudi coalition forces that once had a common enemy soon became fragmented. Instead, their interests seemed to diverge in the South. What followed was that they both became politically, regionally, and ideologically fragmented.

he reasons for the split have become apparent due to multiple reasons, including both Gulf regions possessing differing competing visions for Yemen’s political structure and future. At the core of it, two blocs seem to have become apparent as Saudi Arabia continues to back the internationally recognised Yemeni government. They aim to keep a secure and unified Yemen, especially its northern borders. However, the UAE, in contrast, desires control of key ports and shipping zones due to its economic interests and hence supports the Southern Transitional Council (STC) – a separatist regime that seeks autonomy and independence from Southern Yemen. Southern Yemen especially holds key strategic ports such as Mukalla and Aden that connect the Red Sea and the Indian ocean which is what the UAE economically favours, given its interest in expanding its maritime influence. This aligns with the broader Emirati strategy of projecting power through coastal control rather than territorial dominance. It also indicates a shift toward indirect power projection, which continues to reshape regional geopolitics beyond Yemen. In contrast to the UAE’s economic interests, Saudi Arabia desires a different approach that targets its security interests by keeping a united Yemen near its borders. While tensions brew, both nations have avoided formal war and avoided military confrontation, but the situation remains fragile.

In the midst of this, the Houthis continue their control over Sana’a and most of North-Western Yemen as the UAE-Saudi split continues. Hence, the Emirati position that supports Southern separatism continues to contradict the Saudi position for a united territorial front in Yemen as their overlapping economic and security ambitions clash.

Furthermore, the rivalry has become more pronounced after proxy competition between the two powers intensified. The UAE-backed STC decided to launch direct attacks on the regions that accounted for half of Yemen’s territory, such as Al-Mahra and Hadramout. Hadramout’s Al-Khasha military camp bordering Saudi Arabia was attacked, which resulted in the death of 20 individuals. In reaction, Saudi Arabia believed this to be a violation of their national security and attacked a faction of the STC, as both Al-Mahra and Hadramout are viewed as buffer zones. Hence, this unprecedented escalation resulted in coalitions on both sides engaging in skirmishes.

Another source of tension is the difference between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in their approach to the war. This is demonstrated by Saudi Arabia’s significant investment in both military and political spheres. This strategy involves deploying air operations and government offensives. In contrast, the UAE has announced withdrawal of its remaining forces and continues to frame this move as it concludes all of its counterterrorism missions conducted in coordination with partners. While Abu Dhabi presents its withdrawal as de-escalatory, critics continue to argue that the UAE continues to exert influence indirectly through the STC. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, perceives Emirati disengagement as selective – reducing direct exposure while preserving leverage through proxies.

Many argue that the Saudi-UAE rivalry will prolong the Yemen conflict. This will have serious implications on the region as the rupture of relations between the once-up – on-a-time solid allies will serve to benefit the Houthis; it will entrench their influence within Northern Yemen, as their rivals fight amongst themselves. This will only serve to delay any prospect of a lasting peace settlement in Yemen. Ultimately, the constant internal strife in Yemen would lead to the worst humanitarian consequences, as not only will civilians bear the brunt of the war, but inconsistent governance and rival security forces overlapping in the South would mean delayed reconstruction efforts for the ordinary people.

Externally, the Yemen experience has showcased how rifts between Gulf states on matters of regional issues can easily arise when national interests diverge. The limitations of the regional entity Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), can easily be seen, which can unravel all the hard, painstaking global security efforts within the Gulf region. Hence, external factors such as rifts between the global powers of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, alongside Iranian intervention, can reduce the effectiveness of the collective Gulf response in times of regional crisis.

To conclude, the Saudi-UAE relationship in Yemen illustrates how alliances in the Middle East are often conditional and interest-based. While both states entered the Yemen conflict as partners against a common threat, conflicting strategic objectives, proxy competition, and political and economic ambitions gradually transformed cooperation into rivalry. The implications have been profound, ranging from pro – longed conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, weakened regional unity, and a recalibration of Gulf foreign policies. Hence, Yemen has not only become a battlefield for a civil war but also a stage for Gulf power competition.

The writer is our Editorial Assistant.

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