January 17 launched a series of new apprehensions within the realm of cross-border neighborly relations;potentially giving rise to a new trajectory that is often unexplored by political analysts and pundits within the unfolding Middle Eastern crisis.
Pakistan was jilted by the launch of Iranian cross-border missiles on its homeland that violated its sovereign airspace which resulted in damaging a mosque, killing two and injuring five Pakistani national civilians in the process; albeit Iranian officials claimed the attack that unfolded within Baluchistan’s Panjgur district was targeted against hideouts of Sunni radical militant group known as Jaish-E-Adl who previously have had a record of creating unrest within Iran.
Historically, Tehran and Islamabad have frequently overlooked border skirmishes; often denouncing these attacks verbally whilst subtly hinting how the other has been responsible for allowing armed groups to operate from within their respective soils which have been a hinderance to each other’s national security interests.
However, this incident gave rise to a new regional conundrum as it did not follow due diplomatic course given that recent strikes were not just committed by terrorist havens in another country but sole liability lay with Tehran’s armed institutions that was a clear divergence from prior experiences.
Furthermore, this armed venture undertook a wayward turn as Pakistan reacted to Tehran’s operation by notonly denouncing it but by recalling its ambassador from Tehran and reacting with symmetrical precision via armed retaliation on 18 January by launching ‘Operation Marg Bar Sarmachar’ against terrorist safe havens within Iran’s Sistan-o-Baluchistan province that housed separatist agenda against Pakistani soil. Interestingly, claiming Pakistan’s retaliation, fell under the scope of legitimate self-defense under international law as it only targeted ‘ungoverned spaces inside Iran’.
Reasons for understanding the motives and causes of the conflict require exploring subsequent actions of each nation and their historical rapport from lens of international pollical realism.
Beyond the existence of shared borders, historically, there has been much congruity between Iran and Pakistan when it comes to shared language and culture given that not only did the Mughals adopt Persian as the subcontinent’s court language even prior to Pakistan’s inception; it influenced the latter’s poetry by becoming the lingua franca in which Pakistan’s| national anthem would soon come to be sung by millions in the modern age. Furthermore, Iran was not only the first country to recognise Pakistan as a sovereign state after the latter’s creation in 1947 but also the first country to host Pakistan’s embassy abroad.
However, opportunities for fostering goodwill and trade have remained low and have also contributed to the climate of suspicion between both sides given the imposition of international sanctions which have eventually given free reign to the simmering of cross-border tensions.
Essentially, reasons that prompted the exchange of war-mongering aggression on 17 and 18 January requires understanding that cordial relations existed between the two until the rise of irritants in 2010 owing to the activities of extremist terrorist groups on either side such as Jaish E Adl and Baluch separatists.
Thus, understanding the motives of these groups gives a broader outlook into reasons for Iran’s recent aggressive response. Earlier reports date back to the 2010 suicide attack on a mosque in Iran’s Chabahar region and the 2017 killings of the ten Iranian border guards in Mirjaveh district in which Jaish-Al-Adl claimed responsibility.
Interestingly, both state embassy’s and ambassadors were quick to condemn these attacks on ‘terrorists’ which led to no outward souring of relations despite the fact that September 2021 resulted in cross-border firing in which a Pakistani soldier was killed that led to a more serious consequence of four-month border closure for bilateral trade. It was understood as attempts to normalise trade ties between the two countries and their governments were tampered with and sabotaged by internal and external destructive elements as a border closure was a setback to the possibility of burgeoning bilateral trade relations.
However, tensions did not reach a pinnacle until 2023 when Pakistan’s intelligence (ISPR) announced that insurgents from Iran killed four of its border guards in the Kech district which the Iranian embassy in Islamabad condemned followed by the attack on a police station in Iran’s Rask town which was claimed by Jaish-AL-Adl.
Escalating tensions followed by burgeoning increase in the frequency of attacks on either sides and the lack of affirmation of either state to actively deal with the crisis besides frequent condemnation, began illustrating the growing blistering relation and mistrust between the two sides. This may have forced Iran’s aggressive recent response.
Furthermore, both Iran and Pakistan have insinuated and suspected that terrorist elements have been backed and assisted by the other in which Shia majority Iran suspects Pakistan of harbouring Sunni extremist groups on Baluch soil whereby Pakistan suspects Iran of harbouring Baluch separatist groups in its Baluch-Sistan province. This amounts to mitigating any sense of national security for the two and impacting their rapport as suspicions continue to widen.
Another argument applying the traction of ‘anticipatory self-defense’ for justifying the onset of the recent Pakistan-Iran crisis; a notion that gained justification after the September 2001 attacks whereby states like Iran may consider it their right to use self-defense before an armed attack even occurs which is known as the ‘unwilling or unable doctrine’.
Usually it is not part of widespread international practice but gains notoriety as means of deterrence practiced by states when domestic and international political variables need distraction or abatement; via an act of power display to avert sense of national legitimacy and security crisis.
In Iran’s case, the Middle East is not directly connected but may be intrinsically linked in terms of shared motives as it explains Iran’s need to project its influence abroad and at home. While US and Israel may have no desire to widen regional conflict as they refuse to directly confront Iran who has become emboldened through its support of militant proxies in the Middle East such as the Houthi’s in the Red Sea, flouting international sanctions or allying with Russia in the Ukraine war, the theocracy remains weak at home.
This is due to anti-regime dissidents continuing to rally in favour of overthrowing of the regime after the ‘Women, Life and Freedom’ protests gained support that subsequently rocked the state since 2022. Coupled with persistent suicide bombings in Iran whether it is the notorious record upheld by Jaish-E-Adl or those done by ISIS especially at Kerman during the funeral of revered Iran-backed militia commander Hezbollah that resulted in mass casualties.
Domestic instability continues and concerns about theocracy’s legitimacy to sustain itself and defend its national security are rampant at home which may have propelled Iran to attempt to project its strength at home and to its proxies via a demonstration of force.
Furthermore, Iran’s assertiveness also showcases to the US, Israel and external foes that its domestic instability has not impacted its military prowess. Pakistan seemed a viable target as Iran may have calculated that the risks outweigh the use of force and that both states would act to deter the onset of a full war as was seen by how Pakistan’s mandate involved its use of proportional and symmetrical force by retaliating within bounds of international self-defense. This was aimed to de-escalate rather than escalate the conflict through a tit-for tat precise military exchange that targeted rebel hideouts rather than state facilities.
Simultaneously, Iran’s attack was a warning to anti-Iran militant groups that in its time of crisis, it will not be intimidated and that the state’s legitimacy is intact given as it was prior to attacks on Pakistan.
Conclusively, Iran’s actions not only fall under the banner of ‘anticipatory self-defense’ and acts to deter security concerns abroad and at home by displaying a power-play but Pakistan’s symmetrical response also showcases its need to distract its nationals from politics at home through power-projection abroad.
Both Iran and Pakistan have kept a check on their domestic populous while also conveying the lack of trust the other has in each other’s capabilities to safeguard their borders and insurgent elements within.
Thus, although this incident is not deeply worrying but it emphasises the ever growing need to restore relations, communication and mutual reciprocity between both sides on matters of bilateral and international politics, trade, border and security to prevent future regional crisis.
The writer is international affairs and political economy analyst.
