Previously, the blight of insurgency that once stained Pakistan’s vibrant cultural, economic and political landscape had seemingly dimmed but now a new resurgence appears to threaten the emerging peace. With the most recent November attacks, the echoes of dissent and unrest that once reverberated across the isolated and distant mountainous valleys has now crept its way back into the vibrant hustle and bustle of the urban city centers. What remains imperative is that the insurgent goal remains to geo-politically destabilise the SouthAsian nation to ensure the idiosyncrasies of the separatist and theologically driven groups are met, often at the expense of explosive attacks. These result in mounting casualties as civilian and law enforcement lives are razed to the ground. Sobering tales of rapidly inclining insurgent attacks continue to plague the nation week after week but to understand this tumultuous phenomenon, it is important to understand the manifesto of these dissenting groups, their support network and the strategies that have allowed them to evolve into a resilient force despite being outlawed by national and international watchdogs.
Despite the waning emphasis on terrorist activities, recent events in 2023 have thrust the issue back into the limelight; particularly starting with the February 2023 KPO (Karachi Police Office) attack where heavily armed Islamist militants stormed the station and although the operation resulted in the killing of three terrorists, those mortally afflicted happened to be the police agents who made up majority of the casualties. The attack hoped to create an environment of fear mongering and rattled the masses by showcasing them that if law enforcement agents cannot be safe in their own headquarters, how can the masses be expected to be safe within their own nation? The intervention of the armed forces and their geo-fencing allowed for the detection of the masterminds behind the attack but the search still continues. However, in August 2023 alone, the ‘Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies’ recorded an increase in surgical strikes and targeted attacks while claiming it to be the most violent month since November 2014. Soon after, September 6th witnessed Islamist militants who rattled Chitral district which is home to the tourist hub and inhabitants of Kalash, a non-Muslim minority ethnic group as four soldiers and twelve militants were killed in the crossfire that led to a three-day curfew. It would be erroneous of us to suspect that such attacks only pave the way for militants to ensure territorial control.
Rather they wish to destabilise the economic stability of the Northern region by dismantling its tourism revenue given that Chitral’s culture and people are known to beguile locals and foreign tourists alike. Similarly, Sweden-based researcher Abdul Syed argues that by leveraging Chitral’s mountainous terrain, the terrorist factions who were initially pushed to the periphery in reaction to the success of Operation “Zarb-E-Azb” as conducted by armed forces in retaliation to the Army Public School (APS) attack on December 2014, have strategically opted for a resurgence from the fringes. They wish to make their presence felt in areas that were initially devoid of their existence, particularly by expanding their attack range to major populous cities and high-profile localities. By employing strategic guerilla warfare and adopting a fresh approach that seeks to reduce civilian casualties by concentrating targeted pursuit against law enforcement personnel. This is as backed by Abdul Sayed and Rising Insurgency: A Notorious Tale DECEMBER 2023 Tore Hamming’s findings in “Surging Threat” that assesses the emerging change in the TTP’s modus operandi since 2021. One notices how these terrorist groups wish to make their territorial comeback while also hoping to preserve some semblance of grassroot support among the masses which appeared to have been previously dwindling.
At the helm of this crisis, the actions and motivations of the globally outlawed terrorist group known as ‘Tehreek-Taliban Pakistan’(TTP) has not only come under major scrutiny but its notoriety continues since its inception in 2007. Not only does this group claim itself to be an offshoot of the Afghan Taliban government but it claims to share akin aspirations as its ideological goal aligns with the creation of establishing an Islamic Caliphate, similar to the footsteps of the incumbent Afghan government that calls for upholding and indoctrinating the purest form of “Sharia”. One may also claim that as an offshoot, they seemingly enjoy mixed relations with the Afghan Taliban as the latter has neither outrightly condemned or accepted the groups existence but similarly reports have emerged of how Afghan soil has been used to launch ambush attacks against Pakistani soil, provide safe haven and recuperation for these militant groups.
Often the adage, “the weak wait for opportunities but strong men make them” as endorsed by Orison Swett Marden does hold some truth while by no means does one seek to justify or ratify the behavior of militants, one must agree that they have succeeded in carving opportunities for themselves when all odds seem stacked against them. Such claims can be backed by how in 2023 alone, Pakistan witnessed an upsurge in militant attacks that re- sulted in 700 security forces dead, a testament to how the Taliban have changed course when it comes to directing majority attacks against law enforcement rather than civilians. Similarly, after a prolonged period of calm, Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) and Baluchistan have been rocked by militant attacks; particularly given the relentless attacks in the first week of November 2023 where two principal attacks took place simultaneously in both provinces within the span of one day. November 3rd witnessed not only the militant onslaught on the Pasni to Gwadar military convoy which resulted in the martyrdom of fourteen soldiers in the South-Western Baloch province but soon after, Friday’s attack was followed by a bomb explosion near a police petrol in the Northwestern KPK province.
This resulted in the death of five police personnel and injured twenty others in the process. Some may recount that the similarities between the former and latter attacks resonated with each other as in either case, no militant group claimed responsibility for the attack and those targeted mostly comprised of law-enforcement agents. Furthermore, the TTP’s coordinated effort with the Baloch militant elements on 3rd November is evident as the latter’s insurgency is steeped in their discontent against the Centre; particularly against Islamabad’s facilitation of Chinese ventures like CPEC where there is a perceived lack of commitment in providing a just share to the average Baloch when it comes to extracting economic resources from the mineral rich province. Sayed and Hamming’s findings help to explain that the TTP have aimed to reform and strengthen their foothold in Balochistan by ensuring the creation of an alliance and close nexus with the integration of a battle-hardened Baloch militant leadership who are led by Mazar Baloch, Akram Baloch, Asim Baloch and Aslam Baloch since July 2022. Both these separatist groups differ in terms of their identity with the TTP continuing to exact a demand for sovereign control over the FATA region and possibly hoping to entertain plausible ideological excursions in the mainland. The Baloch insurgents on the other hand seek a political and economic voice in their dissonance against the mainland. Both however retain one commonality which is their need to overthrow the control established by the federal government and its forces.
November 4th was also rocked by the Mianwali airbase attack which was claimed by the newly founded group Tehreek-E-Jihad Pakistan (TJP) but the attack was soon foiled as nine insurgents were killed. However, suspicions did not just fall solely on the TTP but how they have made use of new offshoot and proxies like the TJP to spread terror against the federal regime. This is a growing reference to how these Islamist outfits have manage to survive and show signs of resurgence by adopting new approaches despite years of external rifts and organisational fragmentation. However, these attacks cannot just be linked to an increased frequency in 2023 alone but rather their rising intensity and frequency dates back to 2021 as the TTP were emboldened in the ensuring years to build on the Afghan Taliban’s victory by drawing strength from the latter’s victory and revival in the region. Furthermore, the lack of coherence in Pakistan’s military security response as it struggles to balance two security fronts by aiming to ensure amiable links with the Afghan Taliban while managing the existential and internal threat posed by the TTP has not been balanced as all efforts, ceasefires and negotiations continue to be sabotaged or rejected; hence making progress unfeasible.
Conclusively, Pakistan’s rising insurgency involves the interplay of multiple factors like TTP’s need for sovereign and ideological control, its adaptation of new models within the insurgent modus operandi, its creation of proxies and alliances with other dissenting elements who harbor similar grievances against the state and building upon the Afghan Taliban’s regional revival to feed their resurgence. This underscores the need for not only a strategic counter-terrorism response but that we must not neglect the reasons and strategies that have enabled this resurgence. To ensure our nation’s security is addressed, these internal and external fissures must be dealt with promptly.
The writer is our Editorial Assistant and Internation Relation, Political economy analyst.
1 Comment
Lovely article. A very insightful read.